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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
 
To determine if a noncitizen convicted of a state offense 
is subject to immigration consequences prescribed in federal 
law, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to compare 
whether the elements of the state offense define a crime that is 
the same as or narrower than the generic federal offense.  See 
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 257 (2013).  This 
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analysis, which has come to be known as the “categorical 
approach,” sounds simple in theory but has proven difficult 
(and often vexing) in practice, necessitating a “modified 
categorical approach” and generating an evolving 
jurisprudence around when the categorical or modified 
categorical approach applies.   
That difficulty is borne out in the convoluted history of 
this case.  Here, in what is now Lazaro Javier Larios’s third 
petition for review from prior reversals, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) applied the categorical approach 
and held Larios ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) for having been convicted of “a crime 
involving moral turpitude.”  8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).  
Because we conclude the crime at issue—New Jersey’s 
terroristic-threats statute, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a)—should 
have been analyzed under the modified categorical approach, 
and, under that approach, the particular offense of which Larios 
was convicted is not a crime involving moral turpitude, we will 
grant the petition for review.   
I. Factual and Procedural History   
For nonpermanent residents who meet the eligibility 
criteria outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1), cancellation of 
removal is a discretionary form of relief that “allows [them] to 
remain in the United States despite being found removable.”  
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442, 1445 (2020).  But those who 
have “been convicted of an offense under section 1182(a)(2),” 
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(C)—which includes “a crime 
involving moral turpitude” (CIMT), id. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)—
are ineligible for cancellation of removal. 
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Larios, an El Salvadoran national, entered the country 
without inspection in 1986.  In 1998, Larios was approached 
by someone outside of a bar and, allegedly because he believed 
he would be robbed, pulled out a knife and caused the person 
to flee.  Larios pleaded guilty to “threaten[ing] to commit any 
crime of violence with the purpose to terrorize another . . . or 
in reckless disregard of the risk of causing such terror” in 
violation of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a).  Some years later in 
2006, he was served a Notice to Appear and entered removal 
proceedings.  Since then, Larios has been seeking cancellation 
of removal.   
The IJ and the BIA in 2008 determined that Larios’s 
crime of conviction was a categorical match for a CIMT, 
rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal.  
In 2008, Larios filed his first of three petitions for 
review to this Court and argued that his crime could not qualify 
as a CIMT because, under the categorical approach, the 
elements of a state statute must define an offense not broader 
than the federal statute, whereas here, “the least culpable 
conduct necessary to sustain a conviction under the [New 
Jersey] statute,” Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 
(3d Cir. 2005)—a threat to commit “simple assault”—did not 
meet the criteria to qualify as “turpitudinous” under 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) and the relevant case law, Larios v. Att’y 
Gen., 402 F. App’x 705, 708–09 (3d Cir. 2010).  We agreed 
that, because it swept in simple assault, the statute 
encompassed both turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous 
conduct, and based on our understanding of the categorical 
approach at the time, we held the statute was divisible.  See id. 
at 709.  That understanding changed a few years later with 
Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254 (2013), but our 
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divisibility analysis then focused on whether a statute 
comprised both turpitudinous and non-turpitudinous conduct, 
rather than whether it comprised different, alternative elements 
(one or more of which may be turpitudinous).  Regardless, the 
purpose of the modified categorical approach has always been 
to determine which portion of the statute formed the basis for 
the petitioner’s conviction.  Thus, we remanded for the agency 
to apply the modified categorical approach to determine 
whether Larios had been convicted of the turpitudinous or the 
non-turpitudinous part of the statute.  See id.   
On remand, however, the IJ declined to apply the 
modified categorical approach and instead concluded that the 
categorical approach applied after all.  The IJ reasoned that 
simple assault, under New Jersey law, N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:1-4(b), was not a “crime” at all, only “a disorderly 
persons offense [or] . . . a petty disorderly persons offense,” id. 
§ 2C:12-1(a).  See A.R. 675–76 (citing State v. MacIlwraith, 
782 A.2d 964, 966 (N.J. App. Div. 2001)).  And because New 
Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute covers only threats to 
“commit a[] crime of violence,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) 
(emphasis added), the IJ explained, a threat to commit simple 
assault was not covered by that statute, excluding the only 
non-turpitudinous application and, hence, the need for the 
modified categorical approach.   
 Applying the categorical approach yet again, the IJ 
relied on BIA precedent that statutes criminalizing “the 
intentional transmission of threats of violence are categorically 
CIMTs,” A.R. 676 (citing Matter of Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. 
949, 952 (BIA 1999)), and the New Jersey Model Jury 
Charge’s description of a terroristic threat as one “convey[ing] 
menace or fear,” id. (citing New Jersey Model Criminal Jury 
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Charge, § 2C:12-3(a), at 2), to conclude that the statute covered 
only turpitudinous offenses and was therefore a categorical 
match with § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I).     
 The BIA affirmed, summarizing the IJ’s analysis but, 
for its own part, stating only that it agreed that the actus reus, 
simple assault, was not a “crime of violence” under New Jersey 
law.  That explanation left unclear whether the BIA had 
compared the mens rea of the state offense—“purpose” or 
“reckless disregard,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a)—to the 
generic offense, and under that analysis, whether the New 
Jersey statute was still a categorical match for 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)’s generic offense.  So after Larios filed 
his second petition for review, we granted the Government’s 
motion to remand “to allow the Board to clarify whether its 
analysis was properly limited to the ‘crime of violence’ 
element of the statute, or, alternatively, to allow the Board to 
consider the mental state element.”  A.R. 54.     
 This time on remand, the BIA held the mens rea 
element, too, was a categorical match, treating both purpose 
and reckless disregard as “an intentional or vicious state of 
mind,” A.R. 5, and treating a threat with that mens rea as an 
“act committed with an appreciable level of consciousness or 
deliberation,” id. at 4 (quoting Partyka, 417 F.3d at 414).  So 
it again rejected Larios’s cancellation-of-removal application.   
 We now consider Larios’s third, timely filed petition for 
review.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
The BIA exercised jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 1003.1(b)(3) and 1240.15, and we exercise jurisdiction over 
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the question of law presented by this petition for review under 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).  Our review of that legal question is 
plenary.  Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 160, 163 (3d Cir. 
2018).   
 So long as its determination is “based on a permissible 
interpretation” of the immigration statute, we give deference to 
“the BIA’s definition of moral turpitude, . . . as well as the 
BIA’s determination that a certain crime involves moral 
turpitude” in its published opinions.  Mehboob v. Att’y Gen., 
549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); see De 
Leon-Ochoa v. Att’y Gen., 622 F.3d 341, 349 (3d Cir. 2010).  
We do not, however, defer to “the BIA’s parsing of the 
elements of the underlying [state] crime,” nor do we accord any 
deference to an opinion—like the one we review today—
constituting an “unpublished, non-precedential decision issued 
by a single BIA member.”  Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 F.3d 170, 
173 (3d Cir. 2014).   
III. Discussion 
For Larios, the sticking point in terms of his eligibility 
for cancellation of removal is whether his conviction for 
making a terroristic threat under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) 
is a CIMT.  First, we explain why § 2C:12-3(a) should be 
analyzed under the modified categorical approach rather than 
the categorical approach, and, second, we apply the modified 
categorical approach to the particular alternative under which 
Larios was convicted: “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of 
violence with the purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless 
disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-3(a).  
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A. The Modified Categorical Approach Applies 
Here   
When a state conviction is subject to federal criminal or 
immigration consequences, we use the now-familiar 
categorical approach or modified categorial approach to 
determine whether a petitioner’s crime of conviction matches 
the generic federal offense—here, whether N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-3(a) is a categorical match for § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) 
and thus qualifies as a CIMT.   
In the ordinary case, we analyze state statutes under the 
categorical approach.  Under that framework, we consider 
whether the “least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary 
to sustain a conviction under the statute” would also be covered 
by the federal statute.  Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163 (quoting Jean-
Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 471 (3d Cir. 2009)).  A 
categorical match occurs if a state statute’s elements define a 
crime identical to or narrower than the generic crime because 
“anyone convicted under that law is necessarily . . . guilty of 
all the [generic crime’s] elements.”  Descamps, 570 U.S. at 261 
(alterations in original) (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).  But if the state offense covers more conduct, then it 
is overbroad and does not match the generic offense.  The 
approach is “categorical” because we look only to the elements 
of the state offense, “not to the particular facts underlying th[at] 
conviction[].”  Id. at 161 (internal quotation marks and citation 
omitted).   
This analysis is straightforward enough for an 
indivisible state offense with a single set of elements.  But 
where the statute is divisible—that is, “(1) the statute of 
conviction has alternative elements, and (2) at least one of the 
alternative divisible categories would, by its elements, be a 
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match with [the] generic federal crime,” a CIMT—then, the 
so-called “modified categorical approach” applies instead.  
Hillocks v. Att’y Gen., 934 F.3d 332, 339 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  The 
modification is a small one, allowing the court to review “a 
limited set of documents” for the sole purpose of identifying 
whether the petitioner was convicted of a CIMT or non-CIMT 
alternative.  Id. at 338.  This modification serves “not as an 
exception, but instead as a tool . . . [for] preserv[ing] the 
categorical approach’s basic method: comparing [statutory] 
elements with the generic offense’s,” while disregarding the 
particular facts of the crime the petitioner committed.  
Descamps, 570 U.S. at 263. 
 When the modified categorical approach is “[a]pplied in 
[this] way—which is the only way [the Supreme Court has] 
ever allowed,” id., it retains its proper focus on the elements of 
the crime: the actus reus, mens rea, and causation.  These are 
what “the State must prove . . . beyond a reasonable doubt” to 
sustain a conviction, State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203, 1217 (N.J. 
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011), or, “at a plea hearing, . . . what the 
defendant necessarily admits when he pleads guilty,” Mathis v. 
United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016) (citation omitted).  
Disjunctives in statutes often provide “textual clue[s]” of 
divisibility, Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 343, but they are not 
dispositive because statutes that merely “enumerate[] various 
factual means of committing a single element” are not in fact 
divisible, Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.   
 Here, the parties dispute whether N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-3(a) is divisible and requires application of the 
modified categorical approach.  On de novo review, see 
Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163, we agree with Larios that the BIA 
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erred in treating the statute as indivisible and applying the 
categorical approach.   
In relevant part, New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute 
provides:  
A person is guilty of a crime of the third degree 
if he threatens to commit any crime of violence 
with the purpose to terrorize another or to cause 
evacuation of a building, place of assembly, or 
facility of public transportation, or otherwise to 
cause serious public inconvenience, or in 
reckless disregard of the risk of causing such 
terror or inconvenience. 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) (1981). 
In view of the numerous disjunctives, we look to state 
law to see whether these are alternative elements delineating 
separate offenses, or merely alternative means to commit one 
offense.  See, e.g., Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 339.  “Whe[re] a ruling 
from an ‘authoritative source[] of state law’ resolving this 
means-or-elements question ‘exists, a . . . judge need only 
follow what it says,’” Singh v. Att’y Gen., 839 F.3d 273, 283 
(3d Cir. 2016) (second and third alterations in original) 
(quoting Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2256), and here, fortunately, we 
have that authoritative source in a New Jersey Superior Court 
decision.1  In State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203 (N.J. Super Ct. 
 
1 Where “there is no opinion or other persuasive data on 
point from the Supreme Court of [New Jersey], [] it is 
appropriate to rely on a decision of the Superior Court of [New 
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App. Div. 2011), the court made clear that § 2C:12-3(a) 
incorporates three alternatives, each of which has the same 
actus reus, i.e., “threatens to commit any crime of violence,” 
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a), and a mens rea incorporating 
either “purpose . . . or . . . reckless disregard of the risk,” id., 
but a different, alternative causation element: (1) “to terrorize 
another,” (2) “to cause evacuation,” or (3) “to cause serious 
public inconvenience,” id.  See Tindell, 10 A.3d at 1217–18; 
see also State v. Conklin, 927 A.2d 142, 143 (N.J. Super Ct. 
App. Div. 2007) (same); New Jersey Model Criminal Jury 
Charge, § 2C:12-3(a) (same).2   
In sum, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-3(a) requires the 
modified categorical approach because it has “alternative 
elements,” and the Government does not dispute that “at least 
one of the alternative divisible categories would, by its 
 
Jersey].”  Singh, 839 F.3d at 283 n.5 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
2 There is no indication New Jersey treats the mens rea 
of “purpose . . . or [] reckless disregard” as itself divisible into 
alternative elements.  Though we have previously determined 
that Pennsylvania’s terroristic-threats statute, see 18 Pa. Const. 
Stat. § 2706(a) (1998), also based on § 211.3 of the Model 
Penal Code, is divisible as to its mental states, our analysis 
relied on the specific structure of that statute, which listed the 
disjunctive means rea in only the third subsection, and not the 
first two.  New Jersey’s statute is structured differently, and 
thus, we follow Tindell and the Model Jury Charge in 
treating purpose and reckless disregard as indivisible means 




elements, be a match with a generic federal crime.”  Hillocks, 
934 F.3d at 339 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  
We turn now to applying this approach to Larios’s crime of 
conviction.     
B. Larios’s Crime of Conviction Is Not a CIMT    
Under the modified categorical approach, we must first 
consider “what crime, with what elements, a defendant was 
convicted of” and then “compare that crime, as the categorical 
approach commands, with the [CIMT] generic offense.”  
Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.   
1. Larios’s Crime of Conviction   
Under Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005), 
courts may consult only “a limited class of documents” 
specified by the Supreme Court to determine which alternative 
version of the crime formed the basis for a petitioner’s 
conviction.  Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2249.  These so-called 
Shepard documents are comprised of the “charging document, 
written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any 
explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant 
assented,” but not “police reports or complaint applications.”  
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 16.   
Here, the transcript of Larios’s plea colloquy reveals 
that he was convicted “under subsection (a), [of a] threat to 
commit . . . a crime of violence.”  A.R. 384.  During the 
colloquy, the judge also confirmed that Larios was pleading 
guilty to “threatening to commit an assault upon a person . . . 
by—causing [him] to be in fear.”  A.R. 391.  Thus, in full, the 
alternative offense that formed the basis for Larios’s 
conviction is “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence 
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with the purpose to terrorize another . . . or in reckless 
disregard of the risk of causing such terror.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-3(a).  The remaining question before us is whether that 
alternative is a CIMT.  
2. CIMT Analysis  
 To determine whether Larios’s alternative is a 
categorical match, we must first ascertain the elements of the 
generic offense.  There is no statutory definition of a crime 
involving moral turpitude, so we draw on “long-established 
BIA principles and decisions of our Court,” Knapik v. Ashcroft, 
384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal citation omitted), for 
its elements: (1) an actus reus of “a reprehensible act . . . . that 
is inherently base, vile, or depraved contrary to the accepted 
rules of morality and the duties owed to other persons, either 
individually or to society in general”; and (2) a mens rea of “an 
appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation,” signifying 
“a vicious motive or a corrupt mind,” Javier v. Att’y Gen., 826 
F.3d 127, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2016) (citations omitted); see 
Francisco-Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 970 F.3d 431, 435 (3d Cir. 
2020).    
With this generic construction in mind, we home in 
on the elements of Larios’s crime of conviction: an actus 
reus of “threaten[ing] to commit any crime of violence,” a 
mens rea of “purpose . . . or [] reckless disregard,” and a 
causation element of “terroriz[ing] another.”  N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2C:12-3(a).  We have already settled that “a threat to: [] 
commit any crime of violence with intent to terrorize another” 
is a CIMT.  Javier, 826 F.3d at 131 (alteration in original); see 
also Ajami, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 952 (stating that “the intentional 
transmission of threats is evidence of a vicious motive or a 
corrupt mind”).  The particular alternative offense of which 
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Larios was convicted is the same in all respects, except it 
requires a mens rea of only recklessness.  Our focus, then, is 
whether the “least culpable conduct hypothetically necessary 
to sustain a conviction,” Moreno, 887 F.3d at 163, for that 
alternative offense is turpitudinous.   
Our precedent provides guidance on when recklessness 
constitutes a turpitudinous mental state and, conversely, when 
it does not.  We deemed a mens rea of recklessness 
turpitudinous for both New Jersey’s second-degree aggravated 
assault offense, Baptiste v. Att’y Gen., 841 F.3d 601, 623 
(3d Cir. 2016), and New York’s reckless endangerment 
offense, Knapik, 384 F.3d at 93, explaining that there were two 
“aggravating factors” in the each statute: “serious bodily 
injury” to another, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1), or “grave risk 
of death to another person,” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25, and 
“extreme indifference to the value of human life,” N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:12-1b(1), or “a depraved indifference to human 
life,” N.Y. Penal Law § 120.25.  See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 622; 
Knapik, 384 F.3d at 90.  Although these statutes required a 
mens rea of only recklessness, the two aggravating factors 
ensured the least culpable conduct encompassed by these 
statutes was still “inherently base, vile, or depraved.”  Baptiste, 
841 F.3d at 621; see Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89.  
 In contrast, we concluded recklessness was not 
turpitudinous in Pennsylvania’s reckless endangerment statute 
because there was not even one statutory aggravating factor.  
That statute criminalizes “conduct that may put a person in 
danger,” Mahn, 767 F.3d at 175, and thus could 
hypothetically cover “even an individual who drives through 
a red light on an empty street or speeds down an empty 
thoroughfare,” id. at 174.  Focusing on the “least culpable 
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conduct,” we concluded that traffic offenses “do[] not 
implicate moral turpitude.”  Id. at 172.      
 Here, the BIA did not articulate what, if any, 
aggravating factors it identified in § 2C:12-3(a), and we 
perceive none.  Whereas the statutes at issue in Baptiste and 
Knapik targeted conduct that risks death or serious injury to 
another person, New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute 
criminalizes threats that merely carry the risk of “convey[ing] 
menace or fear of a crime of violence” to another person, 
New Jersey Model Criminal Jury Charge, § 2C:12-3(a), at 2; 
and whereas those statutes required a mental state exhibiting 
“extreme” and “depraved” indifference to a person’s life, 
New Jersey defines recklessness to include “heedless[ness],” 
“foolhardi[ness],” or “scorn for the consequences” of causing 
fear in another, id. at 3.  New Jersey’s terroristic-threats statute, 
therefore, lacks the type of aggravating factors that we have 
previously recognized would make an offense inherently vile 
and depraved.     
 The Government contends otherwise, pointing us to two 
purported statutory aggravating factors.  In addition to the 
required mental state of “purpose” or “reckless disregard,” the 
Government argues, there must both be a “threat” and “a crime 
of violence” that is the subject of that threat.  Resp’t Br. 25 
(internal quotation marks omitted).3  The argument comes up 
short.    
 
3 As the alternative offense of which Larios was 
convicted does not concern “serious public inconvenience,” we 
will not address the Government’s argument that this would 
also constitute a statutory aggravating factor.  See Resp’t Br. 
25.   
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 As to the first factor, the Government reads into the lone 
word “threat” an “additional, intentional ‘layer’ to the mens rea 
requirement” because it “suggests that the perpetrator must 
initially commit a purposeful act.”  Resp’t Br. 32–33.  But we 
already rejected that argument when reviewing Pennsylvania’s 
terroristic-threats statute in Bovkun v. Ashcroft, 283 F.3d 166 
(3d Cir. 2002).  There, we held a “threat[] to commit a crime 
of violence” was simply the actus reus, id. at 170 (alteration in 
original) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706), and did not carry 
its own implicit mens rea, independent of that specified in the 
statute.  We reaffirm that holding here: Where a statute 
specifies the mens rea, courts ordinarily interpret it as applying 
throughout the statute, see Rehaif v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 
2191, 2196 (2019), and here, nothing in the text, New Jersey 
law, or our precedent suggests we should stray from that 
ordinary construction.4 
 
4 In support of its construction, the Government cites 
Javier, where we held one alternative of Pennsylvania’s 
terroristic-threats statute is a CIMT, in part, because of “the 
psychological distress that follows from [a threat’s] invasion 
of another’s sense of personal security.”  826 F.3d at 131 
(quoting Commw. v. Fenton, 750 A.2d 863, 865 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2000)).  But the Government places too much weight on 
Javier, as our analysis there relied on Pennsylvania law, and 
we did not find the threat alone to be a CIMT, but rather 
emphasized the match hinged on “the communication of the 
threat and its requisite scienter”—namely, “a specific ‘intent 
to terrorize.’”  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2706(a)(1)).  The New Jersey alternative of which Larios was 
convicted is missing half the equation because, as we have 
explained, the least culpable conduct is only a reckless threat.  
17 
 
 The Government’s second factor fares no better.  
Although we agree that the term “crime of violence” does not 
encompass simple assault under New Jersey law, it does 
encompass other crimes lacking in the vileness and depravity 
required for a statutory aggravating factor.  See Baptiste, 841 
F.3d at 621.  Neither New Jersey law nor the Model Penal Code 
defines “crime of violence,” but we draw on the federal 
definition of that term, as we did in Bovkun: “an offense that 
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of 
physical force against the person or property of another.”  
Bovkun, 283 F.3d at 169 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)).  So the 
least culpable conduct under § 2C:12-3(a) would be a threat to 
commit an offense involving the use of physical force against 
a person’s property in reckless disregard of the risk of 
terrorizing that person—conduct the Government contends is 
necessarily vile and depraved.   
Yet New Jersey’s criminal code demonstrates 
otherwise: The offense of criminal mischief, for example, 
involves “tamper[ing] with tangible property of another so as 
to endanger person or property” and causing “pecuniary loss 
of $500 or more,” N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:17-3(a)(2), so a threat 
to commit that particular “crime of violence” would include a 
threat to “chip[] away at the patio bricks around the porch of 
[a neighbor’s] property,” State in Interest of A.H., 697 A.2d 
964, 965 n.1 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997).  No doubt, threats to 
engage in this type of conduct would be unwelcome and 
un-neighborly, but they do not rise to the level of depraved or 
extreme indifference to the risk of causing serious bodily injury 
or death.5  See Baptiste, 841 F.3d at 622; Knapik, 384 F.3d at 
 
5 Given that “crime of violence” encompasses property 
crimes, it falls short even of “conduct that may put a person in 
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90; see, e.g., Matter of C.P.M., 223 A.3d 616, 620 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 2019) (damaging property); State in Interest of 
D.P., 556 A.2d 335, 336 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1989) (same); State 
v. Clarke, 486 A.2d 935, 937 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1985) 
(same).   
 The Government also doubles down on the BIA’s 
reasoning that it “ha[d] not identified any case resulting in a 
conviction under this statute for far less serious conduct than” 
a prototypical terroristic threat, such as “yelling ‘bomb’ in a 
sporting arena or a crowded movie theater, or a student 
declaring that he is going to open fire in a school.”  A.R. 7.  In 
support, it cites a slew of New Jersey cases signifying that 
prosecutions under § 2C:12-3(a) are generally limited to such 
egregious conduct.  But that is neither here nor there: We have 
held that this “realistic probability” analysis is inapplicable 
when assessing crimes of moral turpitude under the 
categorical (or modified categorical) approaches.6  See Jean-
Louis, 582 F.3d at 471–73.  Cf. Cabeda v. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 
165, 175–76 (3d Cir. 2020) (declining to apply realistic-
probability analysis in the absence of a categorical match 
between elements).  Instead, we have treated “the possibility of 
 
danger,” which we rejected as a statutory aggravating factor in 
Mahn, 767 F.3d at 175 (emphasis altered).     
6 We do not defer to the BIA’s recent opinion 
classifying Minnesota’s terroristic-threats statute, also based 
on the Model Penal Code, as a CIMT because it focuses on “the 
minimum conduct that has a realistic probability of being 
prosecuted under the statute,” In re Salad, 27 I. & N. 733, 734 
(BIA 2020), and we rejected that approach in Jean-Louis, 582 
F.3d at 471–73.   
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conviction for non-turpitudinous conduct, however remote,” as 
sufficient to render the alternative overbroad.7  Jean-Louis, 582 
F.3d at 471.   
In sum, Larios’s crime of conviction has a minimum 
mens rea of recklessness but lacks any statutory aggravating 
factors, so the least culpable conduct is a reckless threat to 
commit a violent property crime, which under Baptiste, 
Knapik, and Mahn, is not turpitudinous.  Larios’s offense of 
conviction therefore does not qualify as a CIMT under the 
modified categorical approach.  See Javier, 826 F.3d at 
130–31; Hillocks, 934 F.3d at 339.  
IV. Conclusion  
After more than a decade of litigation, Larios has finally 
established he was not convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude, and the BIA erred in finding him ineligible for 
 
7 In any event, the Supreme Court has approved a 
realistic-probability analysis only where “the relevant elements 
[for both the state statute and the generic offense] were 
identical,” Singh, 839 F.3d at 286 n.10 (discussing Moncrieffe 
v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013), and Gonzales v. Duenas-
Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183 (2007)); Cabeda, 971 F.3d at 175–76, 
which does not appear to be the case here.  The term “crime 
involving moral turpitude” is not defined in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and even if the statute listed the elements 
of the generic offense, it is exceedingly unlikely they would be 
an identical match with the elements of New Jersey’s 
terroristic-threats statute.  See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 477 
(noting that “moral turpitude” will rarely, if ever, be “an 
element of the underlying offense”). 
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cancellation of removal on that basis.  Accordingly, we will 
grant the petition for review and remand to the agency for 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.    
